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LECTURE XXI

PREDESTINATION

[1 OF 2]

Syllabus

1. Wherein are the terms Predestination and Election distinguished from God's Decree? What the usage and meaning of the original words, Προγνωσις, εχλογη and cognates?

Turretin, Loc. 4., Qu. 7. Dick, Lecture 35. Conf. of F., ch. 3.

2. Prove that there is a definite election of individual men to salvation, whose number can neither be increased nor diminished.

Turretin, Loc. 4., Qu. 12, 16. Conf. of F., ch. 3. Calv. Inst., bk. 3., chs. 21, 22. Witsius, bk. iii ch. 4. Dick, Lect 35. Hill's Div., bk. 4. ch. 7

Burnet on 39 Articles, Art. 17. Knapp, 32. Watson's Theol. Inst., ch. 26, 1, 2.

3. Has the decree of predestination the qualities predicated of the whole decree? Dick, Lecture 35.

4. Does predestination embrace angels as well as men, and with the same kind of decree?

Turretin, Loc. 4., Qu. 8.

5. State the differences between the Sublapsarian and Supralapsarian schemes. Which is correct?

Dick, Lecture 35. Turretin, Loc. 4., Qu. 9, 14 and 18, 1-5. Burnet, as above.

WHILE God's decree is His purpose as to all things, His predestination may be defined to be His purpose concerning the everlasting destiny of His rational creatures. His election is His purpose of saving eternally some men and angels. Election and reprobation are both included in predestination. The word προορισμος, the proper original for predestination, does not occur in this connection in the New Testament; but the kindred verb and participle are found in the following passages, describing God's foreordination of the religious state or acts of persons; Acts iv. 28 Rom. viii. 29, 30; Eph. i. 5; Luke xxii. 22. That this predetermination of men's privileges and destinies by God includes the reprobation of the wicked, as well as the election of the saints, will be established more fully in the next lecture.

The words προγνωσις προγνωσχω, as applied to this subject mean more than a simple, inactive cognition of the future state of men by God, a positive or active selection. This is proved by the Hebraistic usage of this class of words: as in 1 Thessalonians v. 12; John x.14; Psalm i. 6; 2 Timothy ii. 9, and by the following passages, where the latter meaning is indisputable: Romans xi. 2; 1 Peter i. 20. This will appear extremely reasonable, when we remember that according to the order of God's acts, His foreknowledge is the effect of His foreordination.

Εχλογη, εχλέγω are used for various kinds of selection to office, etc., and once, by metonymy, for the body of Elect, Romans xi. 7. When applied to God's call to religious privilege or to salvation, it is sometimes inclusive of effectual calling; as John xv. 16, 19. Some would make this all of election: but that it means a prior and different selection is plain in Matt. xx. 16; 2 Thess. ii. 13. The words προθεσις, Rom. viii. 28; ix. 11; Eph. i. 11, and τασσω, Acts xiii. 48, very clearly express a foreordination of God as to man's religious state.

“By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His own glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.”

“These angels and men, thus predestined and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.”

To discuss this thesis, first, as to men. I would argue first: From the general doctrine of the decree. The decree is universal, If God has anything to do with the sinner's redemption, it must be embraced in that decree. But salvation is everywhere attributed to God, as His work. He calls. He justifies. He regenerates. He keeps us by faith unto salvation. He sanctifies. All the arguments drawn from God's attributes of wisdom, infinite knowledge, omnipotence, and immutability, in support of His eternal decree, show that His agency in saving the sinners who are saved, is a purposed one and that this purpose is eternal (Ps. xxxiii. 11; Num. xxiii. 19; Mal. iii. 6; James i. 17; Heb. vi. 17).

The same thing follows from what Scripture and observation teach us of the heart of all men. We are by nature ungodly, hostile to God, and His law, blind in mind, and certainly determined to worldliness in preference to godliness, by a native disposition. Hence, no man comes to Christ, except the Father who hath sent Him draw him. Unless some power above man made the difference between the believer and unbeliever, it would never vitally appear. But if God makes it, He does it of purpose, and that purpose must be eternal. Hence, no intelligent mind which admits original sin, denies election. The two doctrines stand or fall together.

A number of passages of Scripture assert God's election of individuals, in language too clear to be evaded: Matthew xxiv. 24; John xv. 16; Acts xiii. 48; Romans viii. 29, 30, ix. 11, 16, 22, 24; xi. 5, 7; Ephesians i. 4, 11; Philippians iv. 3; 2 Timothy i. 9; 2 Timothy ii. 19. The most of these you will find commented on in your text books, in such a manner as effectually to clear them of the evasions of adversaries. 4th. The saints have their names "written in the book of life," or in "the Lamb's book," or "in Heaven." See Philippians iv. 3; Hebrews xii. 23; Revelation xiii. 8. The book of life mentioned in Scripture is of three kinds: 1st, of natural life, Exodus xxxii. 32; when Moses, interceding for Israel prays God, that he may be removed from this life, rather than see the destruction of his brethren: 2nd, of federal, visible, church life: as in Ezekiel xiii. 9; lying prophets "shall not be written in the writing of the house of Israel": 3rd, of eternal life, as in the places first cited. This is the catalogue of the elect.

This class of passages is peculiarly convincing: and especially against that phase of error, which makes God's election nothing else than a determination that whosoever believes and repents shall be saved, or in other words, a selection of a certain quality or trait, as the one which procures for its possessors the favour of God. This feeble notion may be farther refuted by remarking that all the language employed about predestination is personal, and the pronouns and other adjuncts indicate persons and not classes. It is "whom (masculine) He foreknow, them He also did predestine." It is "As many as were ordained to eternal life, believed," (masc.) Acts xiii. 48. The verb προοριζω means a definite decision. Christ tells His disciples that their names are written in heaven; not merely the general conditions of their salvation. Luke x. 20; In Phil. iv. 3, Clement and his comrades' names are written in the book of life. The condition is one; but in the book are multitudes of names written. Again: a mere determination to bestow favour on the possessors of certain qualities, would be inert and passive as to the propagation of those qualities; whereas God's election propagates the very qualities (see Rom. ix. 11, 18, 22, 23; Eph. i. 4, 5; 2 Thess. ii. 13). "He hath chosen us to salvation through, etc." And once more: were this determination to bestow favour on faith and penitence the whole of election, no one would ever possess those qualities; for, as we have seen, all men's hearts are fully set in them to do evil, and would certainly continue impenitent did not God, out of His gracious purpose, efficaciously persuade some to come to Him. These qualities which are thus supposed to be elected, are themselves the consequences of election.

An extremely convincing proof of predestination is a practical observation of God's providence at work. Providence sovereignly determines the allotments and limits of each and every

individual's privileges, of one's existence, life and windows of opportunity. . It determines whether one shall be born and live in a Pagan, or a Christian country, how long he shall enjoy means of grace, and of what efficacy, and when and where he shall die. Now in deciding these things sovereignly, the salvation or loss of the man's soul is practically decided, for without time, means, and opportunity, he will not be saved, This is peculiarly strong as to two classes, Pagans and infants. Arminians admit a sovereign election of nations in the aggregate to religious privileges, or rejection therefrom. But it is indisputable that in fixing their outward condition, the religious fate is virtually fixed forever. What chance has that man practically, for reaching Heaven, whom God caused to be born, to live, to die, in Tahiti in the sixteenth century? Did not the casting of his lot there virtually fix his lot for eternity? In short, the sovereign election of aggregate nations to privileges necessarily implies, with such a mind as God's, the intelligent and intentional decision of the fate of individuals, practically fixed thereby. Is not God's mind infinite? Are not His perceptions perfect? Does He, like a feeble mortal, "shoot at the covey, without perceiving the individual birds?" As to infants, Arminians believe that all such, which die in infancy, are redeemed. When, therefore, God's providence determines that a given human being shall die an infant, He infallibly determines its redemption, and in this case, at least, the decision cannot have been by foresight of faith, repentance, or good works; because the little soul has none, until after its redemption. This point is especially conclusive against the Arminians because they are so positive that all who die in infancy are saved.

The declarations of the Holy Spirit in Romans ix. and xi. are so decisive in our favour, that they should realistically end the debate for all who revere the Divine authority, but for an evasion. The escape usually sought by Arminians (as by Watson, Inst.) is: That the Apostle in these places, teaches, not a personal election to salvation, but a national or aggregate election to privileges. My first and main objection to this is, that it is utterly irreconcilable with the scope of St. Paul in the passage. What is that scope? Obviously to defend his great proposition of "Justification by free grace through faith," common to Jew and Gentile, from a cavil which, from pharisaic view, was unanswerable, specifically: "That if Paul's doctrine were true, then the covenant of election with Abraham was falsified." How does the Apostle answer? Obviously (and irresistibly) that this covenant was never meant to embrace all his lineage as an aggregate, Rom. ix. 6. "Not as though the word (covenant) of God had taken none effect." "For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel," etc. This decisive fact he then proves, by reminding the Jews that, at the very first descent, one of Abraham's sons was excluded. and the other chosen; and at the next descent, where not only the father, but the mother was the same, and the children were even twins of one birth, (to make the most absolute possible identity of lineage) one was again sovereignly excluded. So, all down the line, some Hebrews of regular lineage were excluded, and some chosen. Thus, the Apostle's scope requires the disintegrating of the supposed aggregates; the very line of his argument compels us to deal with individuals, instead of masses. But according to Watson, the Apostle, in speaking of the rejection of Esau, and the selection of Jacob, and of the remaining selections of Rom. ix. and xi., only employs the names of the two Patriarchs, to impersonate the two nations of Israel and Edom. He quotes in confirmation, Malachi i. 2; 3;

Genesis xxv. 23. But as Calvin well remarks, the primogeniture typified the blessing of true redemption; so that Jacob's election to the former represented that to the latter. Let the personal histories of the two men decide this. Did not the mean, supplanting Jacob become the humble, penitent saint; while the generous, dashing Esau degenerated into the reckless, Pagan, Nomad chief? The selection of the two posterities the one for Church privileges, and the other for Pagan defection, was the consequence of the personal election and rejection of the two progenitors. The Arminian gloss violates every law of Hebrew thought and religious usage. According to these, the posterity follow the *status* of their progenitor. According to the Arminians, the progenitors would follow the status of their posterity. Farther, the whole discussion of these chapters is personal, it is individuals with whom God deals here. The election cannot be of masses to privilege, because the elect are explicitly excepted out of the masses to which they belonged ecclesiastically. See chapter ix. 6, 7, 15, 23, 24; chapter ix. 2, 4, 5, 7. "The election hath obtained it and the rest were blinded." The discussion ranges, also, over others than Hebrews and Edomites, to Pharaoh, an individual unbeliever, etc. Last, the blessings given in this election are personal (see Rom. viii. 29; Eph. i. 5; 2 Thess. ii. 13).

God's decree we found possessed of the properties of unity, universality, eternity, efficiency and immutability, sovereignty, absoluteness and wisdom. Inasmuch as predestination is but a part, to our apprehension, of this decree, it partakes of all those properties, as a part of the whole. And the general evidence would be the same presented on the general subject of the decree. The part of course is not universal as was the whole. But we shall find just what the general argument would have led us to expect: that the decree of predestination is:

(a) Eternal. Ephesians i. 4, "He hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world." 2 Thessalonians ii. 13, "From the beginning." 2 Timothy i. 9, "Before the world began." (See last Lecture)

(b) Immutably efficacious. There is no reason why this part of the decree should not be as much so as all the rest: for God's foreknowledge and control of the acts of all His creatures have been already established. He has no more difficulty in securing the certain occurrence of all those acts of volition, from man and devils, which are necessary to the certain redemption of the elect, than in any other department of His almighty providence. Why then, should this part of the decree be exempted from those emphatic assertions of its universal and absolute efficacy (Num. xxiii. 19; Ps. xxxiii. 11; Isa. xlvi. 10)? But farther, unless God's purpose of saving each elect sinner were immutable and efficacious, Christ would have no certain warrant that He would ever see of the travail of His soul at all. For the same causes that seduce one might seduce another. Again: no sinner is saved without special and Almighty grace; for his depravity is total, and his heart wholly averse from God; so that if God has not provided, in His eternal plan, resources of gracious power, adequate to subdue unto Himself, and to sustain in grace, every sinner He attempts to save, I see no probability that any will be saved at all. For, the proneness to apostasy is such in all, that if God did not take efficacious care of them, the best would backslide and fail of Heaven. The efficacy of the decree of election is also proved by the fact, that God has pre-

arranged all the means for its effectuation. See. Romans viii. 29, 30. And in fine, a multitude of Scripture confirms this precious truth (Matt. xxiv. 25; John x. 28-30, xvii. 6, 12; Heb. vi. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 19).

Objections against this gracious truth are almost countless, as though, instead of being one of the most precious in Scripture, it were oppressive and cruel. It is said that the infallibility of the elect, and their security in Christ, Matt. xxiv. 24; John x. 28, only guarantee them against such assaults as their free will may refuse to assent to; and imply nothing as to the purpose of God to permit or prevent the object of His favour from going astray of his own accord. Not to tarry on more minute answers, the simple reply to this is: that then, there would be no guarantees at all; and these gracious Scriptures are mere mockeries of our hope; for it is notorious that the only way the spiritual safety of a believer can be injured is by the assent of his own free will; because it is only then that there is responsibility or guilt.

It is objected that this election cannot be immutably efficacious, because we read in Scripture of saints who are warned against forfeiting it; of others who felt a wholesome fear of doing so; and of God's threats that He would on occasion of certain sins blot their names from His book of life, etc. (Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. ix. 27; Ps. lxix. 28; Rev. xxii. 19; 2 Pet. i. 10). As to the last passage, to make sure βεβαιαν ποιοεσθαι, our election, is most manifestly spoken only with reference to the believer's own apprehension of it, and comfort from it; not as to the reality of God's secret purpose. This is fully borne out by the means indicated—diligence in holy living. Such fruits being the consequence, and not the cause of God's grace to us, it would simply be preposterous to propose to ensure or strengthen His secret purpose of grace, by their productions. All they can do is to strengthen our own apprehension that such a purpose exists. When the persecuted Psalmist prays, Psalm lxix. 28, that God would “blot his enemies out of the book of the living,” it by no means seems clear that anything more is imprecated than their removal from this life. But grant the other meaning, as we do, in Revelation xxii. 19, the obvious explanation is that God speaks of them according to their seeming and profession. The language is adapted *ad hominem*. It is not intended to decide whether God has a secret immutable purpose of love or not, as to them, whether they were ever elected and effectually called indeed, and may yet be lost; but it only states the practical truth, that wickedness would forfeit that position in God's grace, which they professed to have. Several of the other passages are in part explained by the fact that the Christians addressed had not yet attained a comfortable assurance that they were elected. Hence they might most consistently feel all these wholesome fears, lest the partial and uncertain hope they entertained might turn out spurious. But the most general and thorough answer which covers all these cases is this: Granting that God has a secret purpose infallibly to save a given soul, that purpose embraces means as fully as ends; and those means are such as suit a rational free agent, including all reasonable appeals to hope and fear, prospect of danger, and such like reasonable motives. Now, that an elect man may fall totally, is naturally possible, considering him in his own powers; hence, when God plies this soul with fears of falling it is by no means

any proof that God intends to permit him to fall, in His secret purpose. Those fears may be the very means designed by God to keep him from it.

God's predestination is wise. It is not grounded on the foreseen excellence of the elect, but it is doubtless grounded on good reasons, worthy of the divine wisdom. See Romans xi.-end, words spoken by Paul with especial reference to this part of the decree. The sovereignty and unconditional nature of God's predestination will be postponed till we come to discuss the Arminian view.

There is undoubtedly a predestination of angels. They are a part of God's creation and government and if what we have asserted of the universality of His purpose is true, it must fix their destiny and foresee all their acts, just as men's. His sovereignty, wisdom, infinite foreknowledge, and power necessitate the supposition. The Scriptures confirm it, telling us of elect angels (1 Tim. v. 21); of "holy angels," (Matt. xxv. 31), *et passim*, as contrasted with wicked angels; that "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgement," 2 Peter ii. 4. Of the "everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. xxv. 41). Of the "angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, whom God hath reserved under darkness, in everlasting chains unto the judgment of the great day," (Jude 6) and of Michael and his angels, and the Dragon and his angels" (Rev. xii. 7). Collating these passages, I think we clearly learn, that there are two kinds of spirits of that order; holy and sinful angels, servants of Christ and servants of Satan; that they were all created in an estate of holiness and happiness, and abode in the region called Heaven; (God's holiness and goodness are sufficient proof that He would never have created them otherwise), that the evil angels voluntarily forfeited their estate by sinning, and were then excluded forever from Heaven and holiness; that those who maintained their estate were elected thereto by God, and that their estate of holiness and blessedness is now forever assured. Now the most natural inference from these Bible facts is, that a covenant of works was the dispensation under which God's predestination of angels was effectuated. The fact that those who sinned, fell thereby into a state of irreparable condemnation is most naturally explained by such a covenant. The fact that the elect angels received the adoption of life by maintaining their holiness for a time, seems almost to necessitate that supposition. That the probation under that covenant was temporary is implied in the fact that some are already separated and known as elect, while others are condemned. The former must be finally justified and confirmed; the latter finally reprobated.

Now it is manifest, that these gracious and righteous dealings of God with His angels in time were all foreordained by Him from eternity. Those who fell, He must have permissively ordained to fall, and those who are confirmed, He must have selected from eternity to be confirmed. But in two respects, this election of angels differs from that of men. God's predestination apprehended men as all lying alike in a mass of total depravity and condemnation, and the difference He has made was in pure mercy, unprompted by any thing of good foreseen in the saints. But God's predestination apprehended angels as standing alike in innocency at first, and as left to the

determination of a will which, as yet, had full ability to keep the law perfectly. In the election of men, while the decree is unconditional, its execution is dependent on the elect man's believing and repenting. So, in the case of angels, while the decree was unconditional, the effectuation of it seems to have been conditioned on the elect angel's keeping the law perfectly for a given time. Now here is the difference of the two cases; in the elect man the ability of will to perform that condition of his salvation is inwrought in him by God's power, executing His efficacious decree, (see the Chapter of Decrees.) by His sovereign and almighty regeneration of the dead soul. In the case of the elect angel, the condition of his salvation was fulfilled in his own natural strength; and was ordained by God no otherwise than by His permissive decree. So also, the effectuating of the reprobation of the non-elect angels was dependent on their voluntary disobedience, and this too was only determined by God's permissive decree. It has been asked if all the angels were alike innocent and peccable, with full ability of will to keep the law perfectly, and yet with freedom of will to sin; how came it that the experiment did not result alike for all, that all did not fall or stand, that like causes did not produce like effects? Must there not have been a cause for the different results? And must not this cause be sought outside the angels' wills, in God's agency? The answer may be that the outward relations of no two beings to circumstances and beings other than themselves can ever be identical. In those different circumstances were presented occasional causes for volitions, sufficient to account for different volitions from wills that were at first in similar moral states. And it was by His providential ordering of those outward relations and circumstances, that God was able permissively to determine the results. Yet the acts of the two classes of angels, good and bad, were wholly their own.

The second difference between their election and man's is that the angels were not chosen in a mediator. They needed none, because they were not chosen out of a state of guilt, and had not arrayed God's moral attributes against them. Some have supposed that their confirming grace was and is mediated to them by Jesus Christ, quoting Colossians ii. 10; 1 Peter i. 12; Hebrews i. 6; Philippians ii. 10; 1 Peter iii. 22; Ephesians i. 10; Colossians i. 14, 15, 20.

These passages doubtless teach that the Son was, in the beginning, the immediate agent of creation for these, as for all other beings; and that the God-man now includes angels in His mediatorial kingdom, in the same sense in which He includes the rest of the universe, besides the saints. But that He is not a mediator for angels is clear, from the fact that, while He is never called such, He is so emphatically called "the Mediator between God and man" (1 Tim. ii. 5). Second. He has assumed no community of nature with angels. Last. It is expressly denied in Hebrews ii. 16, 17. (Greek.)

All who call themselves Calvinists admit that God's decree is, in His mind, a contemporaneous unit. Yet the attempt to assign an order to its relative parts has led to three different schemes of predestination: that of the Supralapsarian, of the Sublapsarian, and of the Hypothetic Universalist.

The first suppose that in a rational mind, that which is ultimate as end, is first in design; and that, in the process of planning, the mind passes from the end to the means, travelling as it were

backwards. Hence, God first designed His own glory by the salvation of a definite number of men conceived as yet only as *in posse*, and the reprobation of another definite number; that then He purposed their creation, then the permission of their fall, and then the other parts of the plan of redemption for the elect. I do not mean to represent that they impute to God an actual succession of time as to the rise of the parts of the decree in His eternal mind, but that these divines represent God as planning man's creation and fall, as a means for carrying out His predestination, instead of planning his election as a means for repairing his fall.

The Sublapsarian assigns the opposite order; that God determined to create man in His own image, to place him under a covenant of works, to permit his fall, and with reference to the fallen and guilty state thus produced, to elect in sovereign mercy some to be saved, passing by the rest in righteous judgment upon their sins, and that He further decreed to send Jesus Christ to redeem the elect. This milder scheme the Supralapsarians assert to be attended with the vice of the Arminian, in making the decree conditional; in that God's decree of predestination is made dependent on man's use of his free will under the covenant of works. They also assert that their scheme is the symmetrical one, in that it assigns the rational order which exists between ultimate end and intermediate means.

In my opinion this is a question which never ought to have been raised. Both schemes are illogical and contradictory to the true state of facts. But the Sublapsarian is far more Scriptural in its tendencies, and its general spirit far more honourable to God. The Supralapsarian, under a pretence of greater symmetry, is in reality the more illogical of the two, and misrepresents the divine character and the facts of Scripture in a repulsive manner. The view from which it starts, that the ultimate end must be first in design, and then the intermediate means, is of force only with reference to a finite mind. God's decree has no succession; and to Him no successive order of parts; because it is a contemporaneous unit, comprehended altogether, by one infinite intuition. In this thing, the statements of both parties are untrue to God's thought. The true statement of the matter is, that in this co-etaneous, unit plan, one part of the plan is devised by God with reference to a state of facts which He intended to result from another part of the plan; but all parts equally present, and all equally primary to His mind. As to the decree to create man, to permit his fall, to elect some to life; neither part preceded any other part with God. But His purpose to elect had reference to a state of facts which was to result from His purpose to create, and permit the fall. It does not seem to me that the Sublapsarian scheme makes the decree conditional. True, one result decreed is dependent on another result decreed; but this is totally another thing. No scheme can avoid this, not even the Supralapsarian, unless it does away with all agency except God's, and makes Him the direct author of sin.

But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.

(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived *in posse* only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny

given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.

(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect “out of the world,” John xv. 19, and out of the “same lump” with the vessels of dishonour (Rom. ix. 21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non-elect, in the common state of sin and misery.

(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. i. 4; iii. 11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. i. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 13).

(d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. ix. 15 16, xi. 5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. ix. 22). Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turretin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.

1. “By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.

2. “It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.

3. “It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.

4. “It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them.”